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Abstract 
The case for the greater use of narrative disclosures within the annual report package 
continues to attract support from accounting academics. After a decade of 
comparatively limited attention, the topic of narrative reporting has returned to the 
accounting research agenda, in part in association with integrated reporting and a 
growing interest in accounting for business models, as well as a resurgence of 
intellectual capital research. In the light of a continuing optimism that narrative 
reporting will eventually assume its rightful place within financial reporting, the paper 
reports and reflects upon the findings of a study of the outcome of the Danish Guideline 
Project in the decade following its conclusion in late 2002. This initiative placed a 
heavy emphasis on the extension of narrative reporting in its principal output, the 
Intellectual Capital Statement, still widely regarded as a highly promising intellectual 
capital reporting framework. Based on insights derived from the study, the paper 
identifies a number of major obstacles that confront the advocates of narrative 
disclosure practices, the persistence of which is rooted in the contestable jurisdiction 
that characterises the accountancy profession itself.  
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1.  Introduction 
The topic of narrative reporting has recently returned to the accounting research 
agenda, following a short period of less attention. Its re-emergence is closely related 
to the growing interest in integrated reporting (IR) (BIS, 2010; IIRC, 2011, 2012, 2013), 
within which narrative reporting has a major role to play, including in connection with 
the business model that is identified as being central to this approach to business 
reporting (EFRAG, 2010; ICAEW, 2010; Haslam et al, 2012; Leisenring et al, 2012; 
Beattie and Smith, 2013). Narrative reporting also played a significant role within the 
intellectual capital statement (ICS) reporting framework that emerged from the Danish 
Guideline Project (DGP) (1997-2002) (DATI, 2000; Mouritsen et al, 2001, 2003). The 
ICS continues to attract critical acclaim within sections of the intellectual capital (IC) 
research community, although until recently virtually no attention had been paid to 
documenting its fate during the intervening years. 
The accounting academy’s enthusiasm for narrative reporting is not difficult to 
understand. Comfortably removed from the challenges of actually having to report, the 
benefits of extending the role of narratives in financial statements continue to be self-
evident to many academics. The absence of a reciprocal attitude among practitioners 
is both well-documented and understood. Its advocates sincerely believe that, in due 
course, a greater emphasis on narratives will prevail, and to the benefit of all 
stakeholders. In this scenario it may be that IR will be the initiative that provides the 
crucial turning point. According to the same logic, this might have previously been 
asserted in connection with the ICS. However, in the absence of much empirical 
evidence on the fate of the ICS since 2002, it has been possible for those promoting 
extended narrative reporting to remain very positive about its future trajectory, whether 
within IR or some subsequent development. The availability of such insights is 
therefore of significance to the narrative reporting debate  
In this paper we seek to document the failure of the ICS during the decade following 
the termination of the DGP. To date there has been no previous study of how the ICS 
fared during this period. A study of those companies that participated in the DGP 
initiative indicated that it had been at best only a very modest success, with only a 
small number of companies persevering with the ICS approach (see Nielsen et al, 
2016, 2017; Schaper, 2016). Our explanation is framed in the spirit of the political 
economy of accounting (PEA), as outlined in the seminal paper by Cooper and Sherer 
(1984), and is intended to be understood as a contribution to the tradition of critical 
accounting research. The lessons adduced from this explanatory exercise are 
advanced as a salutory reminder to advocates of narrative reporting of the deep 
seated obstacles that such developments face from an accountancy profession that is 
widely committed to furthering the interests of capital as principal stakeholder. In the 
interests of promoting beneficial change, attention is also devoted to how it might be 
possible to promote narrative reporting, whether in the context of IR or IC, or indeed 
other counter-mainstream initiatives. 
The choice of Cooper and Sherer’s PEA as the framing theory for this paper is 
appropriate on a range of grounds. Initially it might be recalled that their paper, written 
as an early contribution to the embryonic critical accounting research literature, was 
itself focused on “corporate accounting reports”, which we understand would 
encompass both IR and the ICS. By contrast, a labour process perspective would not 
seem to offer the appropriate purchase, being concerned with how accounting, and 
management accounting in particular, is principally implicated in the social 
organisation of work (Roslender, 2017). A second alternative, in the guise of Critical 
Theory, is arguably more relevant to understanding the potential of more radical forms 
of ‘accounting’ such as intellectual (human) capital self-accounts, as characterised by 
Roslender and Fincham (2001, 2004; see also Roslender et al, 2015). Beyond this set 
of critical perspectives there is a further number of framing theories, including 
structuration theory, governmentality theory and actor network theory, whose critical 
designation continues to be hotly debated. Their utility for this particular paper is 
regarded as being extremely limited, although appropriate for other enquiries, as is 
evident in Nielsen et al. (2017). 
In principle we are committed to the extension of narrative reporting within financial 
reporting, and indeed beyond it as appropriate. Unlike many others who advocate its 
extension, however, our motivation is not that of promoting ‘better’ accounting and 
reporting. We take it to be axiomatic that increased use of narrative holds out the 
promise of contributing to a better society or social betterment, if only in a relatively 
modest way. In this respect we view narrative reporting in a well-rehearsed way, 
through the lens of social accounting, understood as accounting to society as opposed 
to accounting to shareholders or accounting to managers. While acknowledging that 
a considerable part of the extant social accounting canon is only minimally critical in 
orientation or intent, the possibility of a more critical social accounting has been 
explored, for example, in the recent work of Cooper and her co-authors (Cooper et al, 
2005, 2011; Cooper and Coulson, 2014).          
The paper is organised as follows. The continuing interest in narrative reporting in the 
UK context is briefly reviewed in the following section, which also documents the 
current reaffirmation of its potential. In section three the DGP and its principal output, 
the ICS approach are discussed. The fourth section reports the key findings of a recent 
study of the fate of the ICS in the decade following the conclusion of the guideline 
project. These findings are understood here as having major significance for any 
initiative to extend narrative reporting and are subjected to a brief appraisal in section 
five. The concluding section embraces the three imperatives of critical accounting 
research identified in Cooper and Sherer (1984) to frame a critique of the prospects of 
extending narrative reporting practices within the prevailing social order.  
 
 
2.  The continuing case for narrative reporting 
In an influential report on the development of narrative reporting practice in the UK1, 
Beattie et al (2004) present an optimistic picture suggesting that the breakthrough for 
which its advocates had been lobbying was imminent. They note that while UK public 
companies had provided narrative introductions to the annual report package for many 
years, an important step change was evident in the Accounting Standards Board’s 
1993 recommendation that companies incorporate a narrative Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR) within the package. A decade of successful OFR experimentation had 
informed a revised and extended set of OFR best practice guidelines (ASB, 2003). 
Complementing this were proposals from the UK government (DTI, 2004) designed to 
modernise company law, which included the incorporation of a greater extent of 
qualitative and forward-looking content within financial disclosures as a necessary 
addition to the predominantly quantitative, historical information that had 
predominated within corporate financial reporting. Beattie et al briefly document similar 
narrative statements that have been successful elsewhere, including the Management 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) popular in North America, as well as drawing 
attention to an European Union initiative to require listed companies to file an Annual 
Registration Document. 
Beattie et al (2004) continue by noting that: 
“Given these developments, it seems fair to conclude that the narratives 
contained in corporate annual reports are now viewed by many influential 
organisations and groups as sharing (alongside traditional financial 
statements) the leading role in business reporting” (Beattie et al, 2004: 4).  
In so doing they link the promotion of extended narrative reporting with a move to a 
business reporting model of financial reporting, viewed as a successor to the prevailing 
corporate reporting model. The argument for a business reporting model dated back 
a decade to the findings of the Special Committee on Financial Reporting, often 
referred to as the Jenkins Committee, that proposed a comprehensive reformulation 
of financial reporting (AICPA, 1994; see also ICAS, 1999). Although generally well-
received by many influential stakeholders in the financial reporting arena, the 
iconoclastic emphases of the Jenkins Report resulted in its implementation being at 
best slow and quietly (although often successfully) contested by practitioners. 
However, Beattie et al were evidently confident that the next step change was 
imminent, with their own empirical study a timely, valuable contribution to the debate 
(see also Beattie et al, 2002; Rutherford, 2002). 
Looking beyond the understandable enthusiasm of academics who believed that their 
sincerely held convictions were soon about to be more widely embraced, it would 
seem that in 2004 there was a growing acceptance that narrative reporting was no 
                                                          
1 The UK is widely regarded as being in the vanguard of attempts to promote increased narrative reporting 
practice, hence the predominant UK-centric focus of this section of the paper. 
longer to be viewed as a useful supplement to the predominantly quantitative annual 
report format. Instead it was rapidly gaining credibility as a valuable complement to 
the financial calculus that had served the accountancy profession for several 
generations. There was growing recognition that what the accountancy profession was 
engaged in in financial reporting, and much more beyond, was the telling of a story. 
The point had now been reached at which it was necessary to accept that not only 
was there a need to recognise that a different story was required as companies found 
themselves facing an ever more competitive operating environment. The manner in 
which the story was constituted needed to change too. No longer could it be accepted 
that it made sense to incorporate only a small number of contextualising, often vague 
and unaudited narratives within the annual report where words provided the better 
means of communicating this content. In 2004 it seemed as if there was powerful 
recognition that words furnished the best way of telling what were at least increasingly 
important parts of the story of successful business performance. 
On page 10 of The Coalition: our programme for government, under the broad heading 
“Business”, the following commitment is set out: 
“We will reinstate an Operating and Financial Review to ensure that 
directors’ social and environmental duties have to be covered in company 
reporting, and investigate further ways of improving corporate 
accountability and transparency” (HMSO, 2010: 10). 
This commitment was probably the work of the then Liberal Democrat Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, and members of his ministerial 
team, rather than their Conservative colleagues for whom such adventures are less 
palatable. The need to reinstate the OFR was the result of it being suddenly 
abandoned in late 2005 by the then Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown. This followed a period of consultation with stakeholders culminating the 
passage of legislation in March 2005 imposing a statutory regulation requiring 
companies to incorporate an OFR within their annual financial statements. As 
Rowbottom and Schroeder (2014) documents, Brown’s motivations were largely 
political in nature, and evidenced a strong degree of miscalculation, with the Labour 
administration pursuing legislation in 2006 to introduce a requirement for a Business 
Review, framed in accordance with the detail of the EU Accounts Modernisation 
Directive, to be effective from 1 October 2007. Like the OFR this was a narrative report 
that covered much of the same ground as the abandoned enhancement, although 
accompanied by a less onerous auditing provision than was envisaged in 2005. Much 
was made of the great similarities between the two narratives, as well as a suggestion 
that the changes were likely to prove temporary and valuable (see also Roslender and 
Stevenson, 2009). 
Within a couple of months of the Coalition taking office in May 2010, the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills published The Future of Narrative Reporting – A 
Consultation (BIS, 2010). The perceived importance of narrative reporting is evident 
in paragraph 1 of the executive summary, which states: 
“Narrative reporting in company annual reports has come a long way over 
the past 30 years. Good narrative reporting should tell the company’s story 
effectively and in a balanced way that puts financial information into context. 
The statutory reporting framework is intended to help boards consider 
material issues facing the business so that they can determine the right 
strategy for long term company success in the interests of company 
members. Social and environmental issues should be central to these 
discussions where they are relevant to the company’s strategy and long 
term success, as should discussion about pay and reward. Companies 
should then use the narrative in their reports to provide the material 
information on these issues to their shareholders.” (BIS, 2010: 6).  
In August 2013 the UK Parliament approved The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic 
Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, which saw a relatively modest 
change in the requirements on companies despite the introduction of a new Strategic 
Report as a replacement for the former Business Review. The role of narrative 
reporting, as evidenced in the August 2010 consultation document and subsequent 
publications, continued to be affirmed although carefully balanced with a commitment 
to reduce the overall burden of reporting and kindred requirements on companies.  
Beyond the positive rhetoric, there is little evidence in the UK to believe that narrative 
reporting is held in any higher regard than it was a decade ago2. It is interesting to 
note that while the opening sentence of Beattie and Smith (2013) observes that 
narrative reporting is now firmly established as a crucial component of an annual 
report, it is the 2001 IASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements that is cited in support of this. A further indication that things may actually 
have regressed to some degree is evident in the following overview of the 
Management Commentary innovation published on the IFRS Foundation and IASB 
website:  
“On 8 December 2010 the IASB issued the IFRS practice statement 
Management Commentary. The practice statement provides a broad, non-
binding framework for the presentation of management commentary that 
relates to financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS. 
The practice statement is not an IFRS. Consequently, entities are not 
required to comply with the practice statement, unless specifically required 
by their jurisdiction. 
                                                          
2 Following the return of a Conservative majority administration in the UK in May 2015 concerns were expressed 
that the provisions enacted in 2013, principally at the behest of their former Liberal Democrat partners in the 
previous administration, would remain a priority. The political upheaval attendant on the Brexit vote in June 
2016 is highly unlikely to change this.  
Management commentary is a narrative report that provides a context 
within which to interpret the financial position, financial performance and 
cash flows of an entity. It also provides management with an opportunity to 
explain its objectives and its strategies for achieving those objectives.” 
(www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Management-
Commentary/Pages/Management-Commentary.aspx). 
We find this observation to be somewhat at odds with the assertion that narrative 
reporting “has come a long way over the past 30 years” (BIS, 2010:6). 
Another dimension to the story presented by Beattie et al (2004:16-20) is how the 
challenge of extending narrative reporting became entwined with the rise of IC and 
intangibles. The failure of the conventional financial reporting model to accommodate 
the growing stocks of these assets was identified as a further reason why the 
profession might look very closely at Jenkins’ thesis, a view previously expressed in 
Business Reporting – The Inevitable Change? of which Beattie was the editor (ICAS, 
1999). During the intervening years the search for robust IC reporting frameworks had 
continued, giving rise to a range of developments, amongst which was the DGP and 
its principal output, the ICS. 
In the context of the present paper, what is particularly significant about the DGP 
initiative is that it accorded narrative reporting a level of importance that arguably far 
outstripped anything discussed in the previous paragraphs. It is no exaggeration to 
assert that the DGP on IC reporting was, and remains, a leading example of the 
promise of narrative reporting. Although it may be possible to identify later, larger scale 
initiatives (Dumay and Roslender, 2013), none has yet attracted the level of critical 
approval accorded its principal output, the ICS. For these reasons we take the view 
that the fate of the DGP offers important lessons for anyone attracted to the idea that 
the future of financial reporting will accord a greater importance to the extension of 
narrative reporting. Whether in the guise of business reporting, reporting about 
business models or the currently fashionable IR development (BIS, 2011; IIRC, 2011, 
2012, 2013; Beattie and Smith, 2013; Nielsen and Roslender, 2015), such initiatives 
entail a radical shift in paradigm to manifest parity between narrative and numbers 
within the annual report and beyond, the case for which remains highly contentious for 
many within practice. 
3.  The Danish Guideline Project 
In 1997 the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry (DATI) began to fund an IC reporting 
initiative with a substantial academic presence, directed by Jan Mouritsen and Per 
Nikolaj Bukh, which continued until late 2002. Unlike the previous wave of IC reporting 
frameworks such as the Skandia Navigator (Edvinsson, 1997) and the Intangible 
Assets Monitor (Sveiby, 1997), both of which exhibited similarities with Kaplan and 
Norton’s more generic Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996) (see also 
subsequent developments including Lovingsson et al, 2000 and Lev, 2001), the DGP 
sought to fashion an approach that was based in narratives rather than numbers (or a 
scoreboard). The first phase of the project, involving extensive collaboration with 
seventeen organisations, resulted in the dissemination of the ICS in 2000 (DATI, 
2000). Phase two of the project, which involved working with 100 organisations to 
demonstrate the utility of the ICS, concluded in December 2002 with the formulation 
of a refined approach underpinned by a “new guideline” (Mouritsen et al, 2003).  
An indication of how radical the DGP was from the outset can be seen in the following 
characterisation of an ICS: 
“[An ICS] forms an integral part of working with knowledge management 
within a company. It reports on the company’s efforts to obtain, develop, 
share and anchor the knowledge resources required to ensure future 
results......can contribute to creating value for the company by improving 
the basis for growth, flexibility and innovation. Its merits lie in expressing 
the company’s strategy for what it must excel at in order to deliver 
satisfactory products or services.” (DATI, 2000: 14). 
Little in these sentences resonates with the traditional terminology associated with the 
corporate reporting approach to financial reporting, although it does align with several 
of the themes evident in the pages of the Jenkins Report (AICPA, 1994) and later 
discussions of the attractions of a new business reporting approach to financial 
reporting, e.g. Wallman (1995, 1996, 1997), ICAS (1999) and Upton (2001).  
While IC has not disappeared since 2003, the resources and focus devoted to 
identifying how best to account for it are not what they once were. There have been 
major new issues for the financial reporting community to engage since this time, inter 
alia the need to respond to Enron and kindred financial crises, as a result of which it 
is difficult to identify any significant advances in IC reporting since 2003. A number of 
recent reviews of IC accounting research (e.g., Alcaniz et al, 2011; Guthrie et al, 2012; 
Dumay and Roslender, 2013) observe that the greater part of sustained research 
interest in the IC phenomenon has focused on documenting extant reporting practice 
and resulting in a growing body of empirical literature. This has been accompanied by 
a reduction in theorising about IC, an absence recognised in the latter reviews (and 
beyond), and accompanied by calls for a more critical engagement with IC in the future 
(Dumay and Garanina, 2013; see also Roslender et al, 2015).  
The first guideline, published in 2000, proposed a three element model characterised 
by an emphasis upon narrative rather than numbers, in contrast to the growing range 
of IC scoreboard reporting frameworks identified above. The most fundamental 
element was a knowledge narrative, in which a company documents how it intends to 
utilise its stock of knowledge resources to create the products and services (market 
offerings) required by its customers. The knowledge narrative should also incorporate 
the company’s mission and values, as in a conventional strategy statement, indicating 
the implicit strategic underpinnings of any ICS. To a significant extent this emphasis, 
like the narrative attribute, reflected the role that knowledge management thinking had 
on key members of the project team. The emergence of the knowledge management 
field in the mid-1990s (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport and Prusak, 1997) 
predates that of IC (management) by a couple of years, and provides a complementary 
set of insights to those associated with ‘intangibles’. As a result the guideline project 
was always destined to be rather more inclusive in emphasis that those that 
immediately preceded it.  
The second element of an ICS is termed management challenges. These are derived 
from the knowledge narrative and identify the key activities that are required, involving 
the utilisation of four generic knowledge resources: employees; customers; processes; 
and technology, in the pursuit of the successful value creation as identified in the 
knowledge narrative. It is these activities that are to be continually monitored over time, 
making use of relevant indicators to report performance. The third element is termed 
reporting and refers to how performance is reported within the ICS. In this context the 
project team envisaged incorporating a measure of scoreboarding through the use of 
financial and non-financial indicators to communicate outcomes. However, these data 
would be complemented by the incorporation of a range of more unfamiliar (to 
accountants) visualisations, selected for their individual relevance and their 
contribution to providing as complete a picture of performance as possible. As with 
many constituents of the new management accounting (Kaplan, 1994, 1995; 
Roslender, 1995), of which the ICS is a further example, what is being commended by 
way of ‘accounting’ poses a major challenge to more traditional and conventional 
examples of that practice. 
The second phase of the project began in early 2001, now under the auspices of the 
Danish Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation (DMSTI). It involved working 
with 100 companies (plus two consulting organisations who acted as facilitators) to 
trial the guideline with the intention of developing a more refined version over the next 
couple of years. A number of the original seventeen companies continued to 
participate but most were new to the project. The outcome was the development of a 
“new” guideline as outlined in Intellectual Capital Statements – The New Guideline 
(Mouritsen et al, 2003). The principal advance was that a further element was 
identified in the form of initiatives, being inserted between management challenges 
and reporting. The project team also took the opportunity to refine their overall thinking, 
as a consequence of which the knowledge narrative now placed more emphasis on 
articulating how knowledge resources were to be tailored towards successful value 
creation and the delivery of use value to users. Management challenges were now 
represented as identifying the specific knowledge resources required for value 
creation, especially those that needed to be acquired by the company or strengthened. 
The new element, initiatives, is concerned with the specifics of meeting recognised 
management challenges, i.e., more operational actions within the medium to long term 
projections underpinning the knowledge narrative and management challenges. 
Reporting became retitled indicators, acknowledging that the entire statement was in 
effect concerned with reporting, with the final element assuming a more conventional 
character – the identification of relevant metrics that demonstrated how successful (or 
otherwise) the company had been in meeting its management challenges through 
action. The contribution of a wider portfolio of visualisations was affirmed, thereby 
reinforcing the perceived radical nature of the ICS.  
Conscious of the challenges of implementing the ICS approach the project team was 
rather equivocal about how this might be possible. It was certainly understood that at 
the extreme it might be possible to combine the statement with more conventional 
reporting approaches that would thereby increase in length. A reduced ICS might be 
incorporated within the extant financial statement package and be subject to scrutiny 
by the audit profession, whose representatives had participated in the project from its 
inception. Alternatively, there was the option of publishing a stand-alone ICS that might 
include a reduced financial report. There was no appetite in 2002 for introducing a 
mandatory requirement for IC reporting, however, thereby necessitating a voluntary 
disclosure arrangement. More significantly, what was reported was at the discretion of 
companies that elected to report, providing whatever information they chose to 
publish. The 2002 Financial Statements Act did require large private companies to 
provide information on about their knowledge resources (=IC), where these were 
adjudged to be important in relation to future earnings. In effect this permitted even 
large companies to opt out of IC disclosure with a degree of impunity. A second act, 
in 2005, required those companies that were prepared to acknowledge the importance 
of IC to provide information on their IC resources in the management commentary 
section of the annual report, perhaps by means of some form of ICS. 
4.  A decade of progress?      
Despite its various merits as an IC reporting framework, the fate of the ICS approach 
has attracted little follow-up research, resulting in a significant gap in the IC literature 
(Rimmel et al, 2004, 2012 provide notable exceptions). The authors were conscious 
that the ICS may not have become the success that its advocates had envisaged but 
lacked any evidence of this and consequently they were unable to offer informed 
statements to support or challenge their perceptions. An opportunity to address this 
situation presented itself in late 2012, a decade after the DGP was terminated. In the 
present paper it is taken as axiomatic that the fate of the ICS has a broader 
significance than simply being an interesting development in the history of Danish 
financial reporting. Such was the promise asserted for the ICS approach, and its 
narrative credentials in particular, it might legitimately be viewed as providing a major 
test bed for the prospects for any substantial extension of narrative reporting practices. 
The initial step in the research project was to identify and establish contact with as 
many of the DGP companies as possible. Around 100 companies were known to have 
participated in one or both phases of the guideline project, including the two facilitator 
companies. Fifty four companies were eventually identified as existing in a form close 
to that assumed a decade or so ago. By contrast 16 had either ceased to exist or could 
not be traced, with the remaining 32 having evolved in some way, 20 having been 
subject to merger activity. In total it proved possible to make contact, usually by 
telephone or email, with 128 individuals who had some involvement with ICS activity 
between 1997 and 2013, half of whom agreed to participate in a full telephone 
interview relating to this activity. Of these only 18 remained with their employers as 
between 1997-2002, while 14 had only had some involvement with ICS activity after 
2002. Overall, given the technical difficulties entailed constructing such a sample, a 
notional 63% response rate is adjudged a considerable achievement (see Nielsen et 
al, (2017) for a fuller exposition of the broader research project). 
In the case of the most fundamental question, the extent of ICS activity, it proved 
possible to elicit a larger number of responses, 78 in total of whom 54 indicated that 
they did not continue to produce ICSs following the termination of their involvement 
with the guideline project. Fourteen respondents claimed not to have produced a 
single complete ICS, while overall the average number of statements claimed to have 
been produced was marginally less than two. On this evidence it would appear that in 
practice the guideline project was something of a failure. Only seven companies 
claimed to have produced six or more statements, with four of these at or close to 
double figures.  
When asked about motivations for participating in the project, internal interest was 
identified as being of more importance than perceptions of external pressure. There 
was evidence of a recognition that IC reporting might be of use to management in over 
two thirds of companies, mention being made of the pressing need to engage with 
knowledge management issues, including human resource management issues. In 
this context it is interesting to note that human resource professionals formed the 
single largest grouping among the 64 respondents who agreed to the request for a full 
telephone interview. The enthusiasm of particular individuals was commonly identified 
as a key driver of interest in IC and IC reporting practices during the guideline project. 
By contrast, external pressures seemed to be experienced more in the case of public 
sector organisations.  
Responses to questions on the foci of ICS activity indicate that employees attracted 
the most attention, by a considerable margin and far in excess of the other three 
generic knowledge resources identified by the project. This was previously 
commented on in both Bukh et al (2001) and Mouritsen et al. (2003). One possible 
explanation of this finding is that such information might already have existed in a form 
that made it relatively easy to re-present within the ICS framework.  
The responsibility for producing ICSs lay with a variety of different individuals and 
functions, although over half the responses identified some form of medium sized 
interdisciplinary group. The finance function (accountants?) did not appear to assume 
substantial responsibility for these tasks, in contrast to human resource management 
professionals who were often reasonably active. Forty six per cent of respondents 
believed that ICS activity was principally for internal purposes, with a third identifying 
external purposes, the remainder being of the view that it was used for both purposes 
in their experience.  
Despite the very modest impact that the ICS appears to have had at the corporate 
level, only a quarter of respondents believed the experience, however short lived, was 
of no benefit. In terms of positive outcomes, it was once again in relation to employees 
that the ICS proved positive. Other benefits mentioned related to creating a better 
awareness of resource issues and, more surprisingly, enhanced external perceptions 
of performance. These impressions were in contrast to the views expressed when 
respondents were asked whether they believed that the ICS had embedded itself 
within companies in some way, despite its general disappearance very quickly after 
the end of the guideline project itself. There seemed to be only limited evidence to 
suggest that this did occur, being essentially restricted to a small number of cases 
where companies began to develop their own guidelines. 
Sustained ICS activity 
Seven companies were identified in the course of the first round of interviews as having 
continued to work with the ICS concept for a relatively lengthy period after the 
termination of the guideline project. Three were publicly owned companies, two 
privately owned with one having moved from being publicly owned into private 
ownership in 2008, the seventh company moving in the opposite direction in 2005. 
Five of the seven intimated that they were still involved in producing ICSs, one having 
ceased to do so in 2010, the other as recently as 2012. One of the companies, a public 
sector IT provider privatised in 2008, provided two respondents, one who had been 
involved since 2000, the second having exited the company’s programme after five 
years, in 2004, although remaining within the corporate communications department 
(see Nielsen et al. 2016 for a fuller account of the activities of these seven companies).  
In response to questions about why these companies initially became involved in the 
guideline project, there was a general consensus that they did not feel unduly 
pressurised to do so by external forces. Affirming a point made previously about the 
role of individuals in promoting the project, three respondents identified themselves as 
having assumed an enthusiastic championing role. In addition, and again reinforcing 
previous observations, two respondents commented on the value that the publication 
of IC information had in respect of recruiting the type of employees that the company 
was more interested in. The information in question also extended beyond that on 
human resource issues to matters of sustainability and corporate social responsibility. 
There was also a measure of confirmation that, despite the accountancy profession 
having representation within the guideline project team, this did not translate to a local 
level, as evidenced previously by the dispersion of ICS practice across a range of 
management functions in the broader sample. 
For the most part, similar motivations seemed to explain why this group had 
persevered with IC reporting over time. Several respondents raised the idea of the ICS 
being an example of a management fashion, although not in a negative way. This 
would seem to suggest that such practices worked for them if not the generality of 
companies, whose experiences there seemed to be a general unawareness of (or little 
concern for).  
Further questioning provided evidence that ICS practice had evolved in a variety of 
ways over time. Five of the companies had refined their ICS activity, particularly in 
respect of the human capital component. A consulting engineering company had 
continued to incorporate a reduced ICS within its annual report that was now 
principally focused on employee information, while two companies had rebranded their 
ICS: a utilities company now provided a “Knowledge and Organization” statement, 
which it continued to incorporate in its annual report and which again was 
predominantly concerned with human capital information; and an administration 
services company had also reconceptualised its ICS as its “Strategy Plan”, in which it 
documented a range of employee matters including investment in human capital. A 
municipality followed the project guidelines for a couple of years before moving 
towards the development of a report that focused solely on employee matters. Working 
with external consultants, a turbine manufacturer had revitalised its ICS activity in 
2006, now publishing a detailed statement of IC resources that also appeared in a 
reduced form within the annual report, with emphasis on technology and employees. 
A second utilities company had also persevered with the ICS, presented as a stand-
alone document for a number of years, before deciding to combine IC reporting with 
environmental reporting in the new mandatory corporate social responsibility report.  
Of the seven companies, it is an IT provider that has continued to embrace the spirit 
of 2002 most closely, initially publishing a range of IC information while linking 
managerial rewards to success in growing stocks of IC. After several years the 
company moved towards a strategic annual reporting approach that retained many of 
the attributes of narrative based IC reporting, all of which was subject to the scrutiny 
of the audit profession, as intended within the guideline project. It may not be without 
significance that this company attracted critical acclaim for its IC-related practices in 
the early days, nor that it was this company that provided the two respondents for 
interview. Many within the original project guideline team will appreciate the continued 
evolution of their ideas and objectives, even on such a modest basis as seems to be 
evident from this study. Equally, the evidence that a focus on employees/human 
capital seems to have become firmly intertwined with the pursuit of IC reporting also 
brings its own rewards perhaps. Although not all contributors to the early body of IC 
literature from the mid-1990s sought to privilege the human capital component, some 
were less inclined to disguise their allegiances, including Edvinsson (1997) and 
Roslender and Fincham (2001). For them, any coherent attempt to account for people, 
however modest, holds out the prospect of a realisation that in the last analysis it is 
employees that provide the key to the sustained creation and delivery of value to 
customers, society and shareholders alike.    
 
5.  Contextualising ‘failure’ 
By any criterion, these findings indicate that the DGP was only minimally successful, 
a finding at odds with the acclaim that the ICS continues to attract among some 
sections of the IC community. The decision to abruptly terminate the initiative late in 
2002 might suggest it was already faultering, although a sizeable number of 
respondents commented that in their own experience companies were not subjected 
to undue pressure to participate in the project, which was recognised to have exhibited 
many merits at the time, some of which still pertain. Conversely, there is some 
substance to the possibility that a loss of advocacy on the part of enthusiastic 
champions for the ICS played a crucial role in the project’s failure. Irrespective of their 
commitment to the initiative, these individuals possibly had insufficient time to ensure 
that the ICS, or some related development, became firmly embedded within 
companies and/or too little opportunity to train their own successors before they 
themselves progressed in their own careers.  
A less sympathetic assessment of the fate of the guideline project is that it provides 
further evidence for the need to be sceptical about the enthusiasm that academics 
regularly display for matters that are of a fundamentally practical nature. Beyond a 
cluster of academic papers, upon which careers were built or advanced (or both), what 
remains of the guideline project a decade or so later? In the process valuable 
resources, both financial and of time, have been squandered, not least by those 
companies who, in good faith, were prepared to participate in it. A more pointed 
observation might be that the project team took a new product to the market and, on 
the basis of evidence collected in this study, found it wanting. Indeed, the initiative 
proved so unsuccessful that there has been little or no enthusiasm in the interim to 
develop a further improved approach, which tells its own story. 
Johanson and Henningsson (2007) documents the widespread alarm and concern 
evident in middle 1990s in a number of global agencies attendant on the continued 
increase in the “hidden value” within organisations, by that time largely attributable to 
IC or intangibles (Edvinsson, 1997). The inability of the prevailing financial accounting 
and reporting paradigm to accommodate this was recognised as having the potential 
to seriously disrupt the smooth workings of the global capital market, giving rise to the 
prospect of widespread, inefficient utilisation of scarce financial resources. At the limit, 
although not always articulated, was the possibility of a serious challenge to the 
continued reproduction of the capitalist order, at that time rapidly beginning to move 
into a globalisation phase. At a local level, the Danish government was conscious of 
the need to fully exploit its potential as a knowledge society. Beyond the rhetoric 
associated with this and similar notions such as the information society or economy, 
was the fact that such societies were likely to be even more reliant on their intellectual 
capital assets than larger, currently more successful societies, in the medium to long 
term. Consequently there was a double pressure to identify reliable ways of accounting 
for IC and to do so quickly. The establishment of the guideline project team was a 
necessity as much as it was a bold initiative, the investment in its activities between 
1997 and 2002 one that it would have been a dereliction of the Danish government’s 
duty to have declined to pursue.  
In parallel, the IC phenomenon was recognised to have major significance in the 
context of the debate about the benefits of moving from a corporate reporting to a 
business reporting model of financial reporting. Following the publication of the 
findings of the Jenkins Committee’s deliberations on this question (AICPA, 1994), 
enthusiasm for the development of a more inclusive emphasis within financial 
disclosure practice began to gather pace. The failure of corporate reporting to 
satisfactorily accommodate the growth of IC, principally on the grounds of the 
difficulties these assets posed for the financial valuation calculus, something already 
evident for intangible assets but now magnified many times, was invoked as a further 
reason to begin to pursue the search for a new paradigm. The English Institute’s New 
Reporting Models for Business (ICAEW, 2003) provides a comprehensive overview of 
the debates to that time. A key point of contact between the business reporting and 
the IC reporting debates was that both largely took for granted the necessity to develop 
and report information that was characterised more by its relevance for users, whose 
numbers were also growing, rather than its reliability, previously the most critical 
attribute of financial information. The emergence of a growing portfolio of scoreboard 
frameworks for IC reporting further emphasised the utility of information characterised 
more by its relevance than its reliability. Equally, the rise of IC underlined the 
importance of seeking to emphasise a measure of future orientation within business 
reporting, something evident within the ICS. 
While the challenge posed by IC had not disappeared by 2002, the financial 
environment had become less volatile and thereby less worrying. Some of the heavy 
turbulence experienced in the later 1990s had subsided following the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble around the millennium. Equally, there was evidence that despite the 
absence of any mandatory IC reporting requirements, companies had begun to 
develop mechanisms for communicating information about the IC-related activity to 
analysts and the broader financial community, who were thereby able to meet many 
of the needs of their client portfolios (Holland, 2009, 2006, 2003; Barker et al. 2012; 
Roberts et al. 2006). Taking a broader view, and with the benefit of hindsight, it would 
appear that the calm conservatism for which the accountancy profession is widely 
renowned had once again shown itself to be a safe option, albeit perhaps only 
fleetingly given the looming threat posed as a consequence of its involvement in the 
Enron and related financial scandals.   
A decade later the accountancy profession has largely restored its collective credibility, 
suitably chastened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. The profession fared well during 
the global financial crisis, which saw bankers cast as the villains of the piece (Laux 
and Leuz, 2009). Having ridden out the storm, the time to revisit the case for a greater 
role for narrative reporting within financial statements may have come around again, 
with advocates from within the academy, government, the accountancy bodies and 
sections of industry and commerce prepared to promote the requisite debates. In this 
milieu the paper by Beattie and Smith (2013) might be recognised as demonstrating 
that things have returned to what they were a decade ago, with the accountancy 
profession now being in a better position to make the necessary progress in extending 
the role for and significance of narrative reporting.   
6.  Lessons for the future of narrative reporting 
In an early seminal contribution to the critical accounting literature, Cooper and Sherer 
(1984) identify the three imperatives that constitute the kernel of the PEA perspective 
for critical accounting research. These same imperatives applied (and continue to 
apply) equally to two alternative generic critical accounting approaches that, in parallel, 
were attracting the attention of a growing number of UK accounting academics, many 
associated with the University of Sheffield, namely labour process theory (or analysis) 
and Critical Theory. The first imperative Cooper and Sherer identify is to be “explicitly 
normative”, which requires the researcher to reject any pretensions of value neutrality 
in pursuing research. Critical accounting research is an engaged praxis that requires 
its proponents to be open about their values, and inter alia their political positions. The 
second imperative is to be “descriptive”, which despite the unfortunate terminology 
commends the extension of studies of ‘accounting in action’ within a broad social 
scientific framework, at that time loosely identifiable as being underpinned by an 
interpretive methodology. The final imperative is that of being “critical”, which 
translates into a commitment to demonstrate the (then) largely obscured contestable 
foundations of contemporary accounting theory and practice. Where possible, Cooper 
and Sherer urge critical accountants to complement the new understanding of 
accounting practices with alternatives that are more aligned with the priorities of a 
fundamentally different social order.  
As we noted in the introduction, this paper is not motivated by any pretensions of 
objectivity or value neutrality, being firmly aligned with the normative imperative 
commended within PEA. The authors are supportive of the various attempts to develop 
IC reporting frameworks, including the ICS approach, on the grounds that the such 
initiatives ultimately would seem to hold out the prospect of providing employees with 
a greater opportunity to develop an emancipatory accounting praxis. After Roslender 
and Fincham (2001) they recognise that the human capital component of IC 
constitutes its primary component, thereby meriting the designation of primary IC (see 
also Roslender and Fincham 2004; Roslender et al., 2015). The challenge to critical 
accounting researchers is to work in tandem with employees (human capital) in the 
development and diffusion of its own self accounts in the form of narratives designed 
to demonstrate the primary role of labour within the value creation and delivery 
process. It follows by the same logic that the authors are in principle supportive of the 
initiative to develop the narrative turn in reporting. However, also being motivated by 
the critical imperative they distance themselves from the position that either or both IC 
and narrative reporting are to be understood as providing a means to pursue better 
accounting, and are committed to fashioning interventions that explicitly seek to couple 
alternative accountings with the promotion of social betterment. In this regard it is 
viewed as axiomatic that the interests served by the prevailing corporate reporting 
approach to financial reporting, as practised by the global accountancy profession, are 
overwhelmingly those of shareholders, and principally institutional shareholders. 
Although business reporting, envisaged as a desirable successor to corporate 
reporting by many of its proponents between 1994 and 2003, acknowledged the needs 
of other interested parties, it did so in a largely unchallenging way. In a similar manner 
history would seem to be repeating itself in the context of IR, which despite its social 
reporting underpinnings, not to mention its acknowledgement of the importance of both 
IC and narrative reporting and disclosure, appears to be very largely the captive of 
traditional stakeholders (Flower, 2015).  
Within the financial reporting community there are many researchers who are sincere 
in their belief that the promotion of enhanced narrative reporting is both desirable and 
beneficial to society. Consequently, they are comfortable to invest their time and 
energy commending it to the accountancy profession. For our own part, it would be 
short sighted to simply dismiss such developments and initiatives as lacking in any 
merit for anyone interested in the pursuit of social betterment within the accounting 
research community. Nevertheless, what the various insights collected in the course 
of the DGP study, an initiative within which experimentation with narrative reporting 
was extensive, reaffirmed for us are a number of major obstacles that remain to 
challenge any extension of narrative reporting practices. It is therefore incumbent on 
us to contribute these insights to the rejuvenated debate about extending narrative 
reporting briefly reviewed earlier in the paper. In doing so, we regard the remainder of 
the paper as enacting Cooper and Sherer’s third, “critical” imperative, albeit largely 
without recourse to the lexicon that is sometimes enrolled in such analyses.       
Securing practitioner buy-in 
A key finding of the DGP study was that the accounting and finance function did not 
appear greatly interested in taking responsibility for ICS activity, in contrast to some of 
their human resource management colleagues. While it is possible to debate whether 
the guideline project was an accounting initiative, many involved in driving it between 
1997 and 2002 held this view, including representatives from the Danish auditing 
profession. At the local level different agendas continue to prevail, despite the 
observation that ‘relevance’, understood as a qualitative characteristic of financial 
reporting, is now regarded as being of fundamental importance alongside ‘faithful 
representation’ (IASB, 2010). For most practitioners relevance equates with the added 
value of an initiative commended to them (in good faith) by third parties. In the absence 
of any specific requirement to implement changes, the prospects for success of such 
developments as IC reporting or the generality of narrative reports are likely to remain 
limited. To some degree this state of affairs demonstrates the power that the ranks of 
backwoodsmen within the accountancy profession continue to wield. Of more 
significance perhaps is a characteristic duplicity on the part of the professional 
accountancy bodies, who readily position themselves as willing participants in the 
policy debate but less given to leadership in respect of actual implementation. For the 
very greatest part, the individuals who populate these powerful leadership positions 
evidence little inclination to challenge the prevailing axiom that the principal purpose 
of financial reporting is to secure and perpetuate the interests of shareholders. Only 
those initiatives that promise to enhance these interests are truly desirable and thereby 
merit commendation to the practitioner community.  
A challenge to accountancy’s jurisdiction 
For the greater part of its history accounting has evolved, or has been developed, as 
a practice firmly based on ‘counting’, understood in a broader sense that we identify 
with the term quantitative. Consequently, it is possible to characterise accounting as 
the generic practice of telling the story of enterprise performance using numbers. In 
the case of financial accounting and reporting, these are for the most part financial 
numbers, reflecting the monetary measurement convention. This also extends to cost 
accounting and some aspects of management accounting, although over the past 
three decades managerial accounting, identified as the provision of accounting 
information to management, as agents of the owners, has seen a progressive 
decoupling of the financial from the quantitative. Such moves in the direction of 
recounting have often attracted the support of accounting academics, particularly 
where they have resulted in a greater degree of relevance within accounting 
information and understood to advance the interests of shareholders. From a 
jurisdictional perspective, however, developments such as the ICS or extended 
narrative reporting promote concern or alarm, since they threaten the exclusivity of the 
profession’s traditional value proposition. A longstanding facility with and mastery of 
numbers is now under threat of dilution as greater credibility is afforded telling the story 
of business performance using both words and numbers, a process that portends an 
increased inclusivity of practice. Human resource management specialists were not 
alone in assuming an active role in the, admittedly limited, diffusion of the ICS. The 
accountancy profession is likely to work to secure its own interests every bit as 
enthusiastically as it can be relied upon to promote those of its principal patrons.      
 Combatting continuing myths 
Few advocates for increased narrative reporting would dispute that it will result in 
reduced disclosures. Information overload has long been part of the repertoire of the 
financial reporting community when faced with calls for further disclosures, as a 
consequence of which many, if not most, practitioners are likely to be predisposed to 
reject the case for narrative reporting. While a commonsense case might be advanced 
to substantiate information overload in relation to individual shareholders, it overlooks 
the fact that analysts have long made use of their own information sets, customised 
and finely tuned to complement publicly available information. Indeed it might be 
argued that analysts would welcome further disclosures, at least those with some 
substance, since they promise to make their own work less onerous. Herein may lie 
the hidden agenda of the information overload objection: a lack of enthusiasm for 
pursuing new disclosure pathways that will inevitably require challenging new learning 
and increased risk, and a preference for institutionalised occupational conservatism 
(cf Holland and Johanson (2003)). 
Complementing the information overload objection is the claim that further disclosures, 
whether narrative or numerical, threatens to compromise the competitive position of 
the firm. This is often argued to be especially pertinent for disclosures that are forward-
looking in content, an attribute that would seem to resonate with the implicit nature of 
narrative disclosures. This argument is premised on the contestable assumption that 
competitors continue have very little information about or insights on each other. In the 
case of large companies, however, not to be well apprised of the activities of 
competitors nowadays makes commercial bad sense. The benchmarking literature, 
for example, highlights the existence of cooperative activity designed to assist 
competitors to learn from each other, not least in order that an industry as a whole is 
better able to offer ever higher levels of customer service (Boxwell, 1994). Finally, the 
identification of a tendency to ‘boilerplating’ as a response to unnecessary 
(=unwelcome) extensions of disclosure activity says rather more about the 
accountancy profession than third parties who seek to modernise its outlook.  
The imperative of making action mandatory 
The decision to not make the use of some form of ICS after 2002 mandatory is a further 
episode in the failure of regulatory authorities to embrace a ‘strong’ stance on 
promoting change in the financial reporting space. The decision to allow smaller 
companies to opt out completely was justified on familiar grounds, namely the 
disproportionate cost of such an exercise for relatively modest enterprises. In the case 
of larger entities, the DGP provision that allowed senior management to assert that 
such disclosures are an inappropriate imposition gifted a license to behave 
disingenuously should they so choose. The prospects for the effective policing of such 
misrepresentations were inevitably extremely limited, with the regulatory agency and 
their government sponsors operating on a basis of trust, for which there seems to be 
limited supportive historical evidence. Mandatory disclosure complemented by a 
rigorous enforcement and monitoring regime would have signalled serious intent, as 
would not tolerating the pursuit of a ‘tick box’ mentality on the part of practitioners. The 
traditional model of reliance on goodwill in response to voluntary models of disclosure, 
inter alia in the case of those that promise/threaten to advance the interests of a much 
wider set of stakeholders, remains inherently and unconscionably flawed.  
These are not new observations. Unfortunately, most advocates of extended narrative 
reporting, like their counterparts around the ICS, would appear to wish to cling to the 
assumption that those whose role it is to breathe life into self-evident improvements to 
practice will be swayed by arguments advanced by well-informed and equally sincere 
third parties, among whom accounting academics number many. This seems to be an 
unlikely proposition given the continuing imbalance of power that exists within the 
global accountancy profession, however. The more fruitful strategy would seem to be 
to install and lobby radical governments, since they alone have the power to put into 
place mandatory reporting requirements with which the accountancy profession will 
be required to comply. A formidable challenge without doubt but one that the critical 
accounting community should continue to embrace.   
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